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Abstract This paper describes and analyses how discourses
of conservation and development as well as migrant labour
practices can be understood as transnational dynamics that
both cement and complicate transnational relations. It also
looks into how these dynamics articulate with, shape and are
being shaped by ‘the local’. Focusing on the north-eastern
boundary of Lesotho in the area of the ‘Maloti-Drakensberg
transfrontier conservation and development project’, we show
how conflictual situations put the ethnographic spotlight on the
ways in which ‘local people’ in Lesotho deal with dual forces
of localisation and transnationalisation. We argue that they
accommodate, even appropriate, these dual pressures by
adopting an increasingly flexible stance in terms of identity,
alliances, livelihood options and discourses.
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Introduction
When his dad worked in the South African mines during the
1970s, Morebane Ramonotsi, like many other young
Basotho1 boys, gained early experience in herding the
family cattle. The steady family income allowed him to
finish secondary education after which he started to work
for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), initiated
by the South African and Lesotho governments during the
mid 1980s. Following his ambitions he went to South Africa
to study Electrical Engineering. When he returned, howev-
er, the construction phase of the LHWP had ended and with
it many job opportunities had ceased to exist. Together with
his brother, Morebane decided to utilise a family hut to
start a bed and breakfast for development workers and
tourists. Now 35, Morebane’s irregular income from the
B&B, which he shares with his family, is supplemented by—
among other activities—working on the family fields, as an
election officer, as an assistant in archaeological work, as
the co-founder of the Moteng Ponytrekking Association, as
the co-founder of the local farming association, and as
secretary of the District Steering Committee of the ‘Maloti-
Drakensberg Transfrontier Project.’ The diversity and
range of his activities has been criticised by a community
facilitator as sign of greediness, while he regards them as
necessary and smart livelihood strategies. He recently
married his fiancée, a shop assistant in the Chinese-
owned clothing shop in the nearby town, and wants to
build her a brick house, preferred by young Basotho women
over traditional huts.2
It is immediately clear from this brief description of the
current life situation of a villager in the north-eastern part of
Lesotho that ‘local’ is a rather contrived concept here.
Contrary to many popular conservation and development
1 Basotho (plural, Mosotho, singular) are people of Sotho origin. The
majority of Lesotho’s population is Basotho, with very small Asian
and European minorities. The term ‘Basotho’ will be used here to refer
to both the people of Sotho origin who also live in other parts of
Southern Africa and the population of Lesotho.
2 This description is taken from the first author’s field notes.
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policy images of ‘the local’ and of ‘communities,’Morebane’s
livelihood has ‘transnationalism,’ ‘multiple identity’ and
‘mixed livelihoods’ written all over it. The research presented
is based on our assumption that ‘the local’ in Lesotho cannot
be understood without reference to transnational relations and
the broader political economy of the Southern African region.
‘The local’ in Lesotho is an intricate and complex amalgam-
ation of trans-boundary political interests, economic depen-
dencies, cultural and social ties, ecological circumstances,
historical events and traditions. In continuing to assume the
perseverance of livelihood strategies centred on narrow
concepts of ‘community’ and ‘the local,’ international
conservation and development discourses and interven-
tions—particularly those adhering to an ideal of community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM)—further
complicate this picture and consequently often contribute to
a widening gap between discourses and realities of what ‘the
local’ entails.
This article describes how international conservation and
development discourses both cement and complicate
transnational relations and how they in turn articulate with,
shape and are being shaped by ‘the local.’3 What we refer
to as ‘the local’ exists through, is shaped by and pervades
the transnational/global and vice versa (Davids and van
Driel 2005; Hughes 2006). In order to achieve a better
understanding of these processes we analyse two recent
dynamics in north-eastern Lesotho and the role of conflict
therein. The first dynamic is the transnationalising presence
of the large World Bank-sponsored ‘Maloti-Drakensberg
transfrontier conservation and development project’
(MDTP), which aims to conserve the biodiversity of the
Maloti-Drakensberg mountain ecosystem that runs across
the eastern border of Lesotho with South Africa while
simultaneously improving the livelihoods of local commu-
nities in the area through tourism. The second dynamic is of
the opposite order: the localising pressures stimulated by
massive retrenchments of Lesotho mineworkers from South
African mines. On many occasions these forces clashed. By
focussing on the level of discourse rather than the
contradiction of these two dynamics on the local level, the
MDTP intervention planners decreased the likelihood of
attaining their objectives (see Büscher 2009).
Two local conflicts—one caused by a MDTP-proposed
protected area and the other by a proposed golf estate in
South Africa—illustrate how transnational influences incite,
provoke, shape and modify local dynamics and vice versa.
We argue that these dual interacting pressures of trans-
nationalisation and localisation are accommodated and even
appropriated by the local populations, who adopt an
increasingly flexible stance in terms of identity, alliances
and discourses in order to increase their livelihood options
and at the same time reconfirm the multiple, interconnected
identities and dynamics that make up ‘the local’.
We first present background information on transfrontier
conservation by focusing on the complex role and posi-
tioning of ‘the local’ within (theoretical) transnationalising
discourses of conservation and development. We then show
how this complexity can be found in north-eastern Lesotho
within the framework of the Maloti-Drakensberg interven-
tion. In the following section we discuss the two local
conflicts and the way in which transnational discourses are
used in the organisation of local opposition. Finally, we
present our conclusions.
Transnational Conservation and Local Development
Conservation in Southern Africa has a long history
(Anderson and Grove 1987; Neumann 1998; Adams and
Hulme 2001; Beinart and McGregor 2003). Yet, in order to
understand how conservation has ‘conserved conflict’ in
the region through its problematic engagement with rural
people, it is important to provide some brief historical notes
on conservation and its recent culmination in the trans-
frontier movement.
Overviews in the literature normally commence by
describing conservation during colonialism and apartheid.
Over a decade ago, Ghimire and Pimbert (1997: 14) wrote
that “parks and reserves have become a major source of
rural tension in most developing countries.” More recently,
Fabricius (2004: 9) argued that “it is now widely accepted
that the particular style of official natural resource manage-
ment that emerged in Southern Africa during the colonial
and apartheid periods generated a range of social conflicts
that now endanger the future of natural resources.” A
multitude of reasons is brought forth for these conflicts,
including (inter alia): forced removal, enforcement of
reduced or no access to land and resources, and general
extension of state control through conservation. Taken
together, these approaches became known as ‘fortress
conservation’ (Brockington 2002; Brockington et al. 2008).
In Southern Africa ‘fortress conservation’ made way—at
least at the level of discourse—for a more socially inclusive
approach during the 1980s and 1990s. The emerging model
became known as community-based conservation or, more
commonly in Southern Africa, community-based natural
resource management (CBNRM). The main principles under-
lying this paradigm are: community consultation, acknowl-
edgement of human suffering due to conservation,
acknowledgement of the value of communal traditions and
ways of natural resource management, and enhanced (nego-
tiating) rights for rural people in terms of access to and sharing
of resources, for instance in protected areas.While CBNRM is
3 See West (2006) and Dressler (2009) for comparable analyses in
Papua New Guinea and the Philippines respectively.
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the dominant paradigm today, it is not hegemonic in practice;
the extensive literature on ‘communities and conservation’
continually emphasises different issues in discourse and
practice (Brosius et al. 2005; Dressler et al. 2010).
Igoe and Fortwangler (2007: 66) suggest that the current
academic debate revolves around four main issues: “(1) the
ways communities are historically constituted in the context
of conservation interventions; (2) the role of external actors/
agencies (e.g., state, NGOs, private enterprise) in this
process, and other types of communities not often acknowl-
edged in the literature; (3) the central role of networks of
governance (as opposed to government) in conceptualizing
and implementing conservation; and (4) the neoliberalisa-
tion of conservation.” We focus on the first issue for the
remainder of this section to introduce transfrontier conser-
vation and to provide a solid background for the other three
issues, which will be touched upon in later sections.
The problematic historical constitution of local commu-
nities in the context of conservation also pervades the
implementation of one of the latest trends in conservation:
Transfrontier Conservation and Development Areas (TFCAs)
(Büscher 2010b). They cross international state borders and
subsume multiple land use forms. As ‘ambitious projects in
nature,’ they aim at biodiversity conservation, the cross-
border alignment of land tenure systems, the economic
development of local people by promoting conservation as a
land use option, and the promotion of peace and cooperation
between nations.4 At the time of writing, 12 TFCAs are
actively being developed in Southern Africa and an
additional two are in a conceptual phase.5
Local populations are generally regarded as having
interests and land uses conflicting with these aims. In seeking
to involve them in biodiversity conservation, TFCAs promise
them, besides training, income possibilities mostly through
ecotourism (Dressler and Büscher 2008). Ecotourism, how-
ever, is often a double-edged sword. While it can provide
income possibilities, it is also often criticized for generating
unrealistic expectations, unevenly distributing benefits, and
exacerbating social differences (Orlove and Brush 1996;
Marcus 2001; West and Brockington 2006). Moreover,
tourism often utilizes images of local communities as living
‘authentically’ with unchanging traditions and culture and
‘in balance with nature’ (Draper et al. 2004). Obviously—as,
for instance, our introductory description of Morebane
Ramonotsi’s livelihood situation clearly showed—this is a
myth. The point is that ‘authentic culture’ sells, and as such is
increasingly commoditised, while often disguising power
struggles about access to and use of land in the process
(Hughes 2002; Spierenburg and Wels 2006). So far, TFCAs
have not been able to address these problems effectively
(Duffy 2006; Hughes 2006; Büscher and Dressler 2007;
Dressler and Büscher 2008).
On the surface then, ‘the local’ is portrayed as a partner
in the community-based transfrontier conservation para-
digm, but more often than not local communities are still
seen as a threat to biodiversity who seemingly need to be
‘dragged’ off the(ir) land (Wolmer 2003; Spierenburg and
Wels 2006; Dressler and Büscher 2008). Although usually
well-intentioned, the aim of benefitting the local population
through conservation always runs the risks of the adverse
effects outlined above. In the end, it often seems that the
advantages promised to local communities participating in
TFCAs serve to legitimise interventions and mask the
conflicts inherent in what are basically struggles over
access to and control over land and natural resources
(Duffy 2006; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Yet, these struggles
do not always necessarily lead to local conflict; they could
also lead to opportunities for (at least parts of) local
communities. In the next section we discuss both the
problematic and the potential of transnational conservation
and development within the framework of the Maloti-
Drakensberg Transfrontier Project.
Transnational Discourses of Conservation
and Development Between South Africa and Lesotho
One of the TFCAs in Southern Africa currently progressing
most rapidly is the ‘Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier
Conservation and Development Project’ (MDTP) between
South Africa and Lesotho. The project area encompasses
8,113 km², of which 64% is in Lesotho, with an altitude
range from 1,300 to 3,200 m above sea level. It includes
three districts in Lesotho (Botha-Bothe, Mokhotlong,
Quacha’s Nek) and parts of three provinces in South Africa
(KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, Eastern Cape).
With a population of almost two million people, the area
has a variety of land uses6 and different tenure systems. The
MDTP was envisioned more than two decades ago by
conservationists in South Africa and Lesotho, but it was
only in 2001 that both governments signed a Memorandum
of Understanding establishing the actual TFCA and paving
the way for the MDTP intervention. It commenced in 2003
and was funded by the Global Environment Facility
through the World Bank for a period of five years. Both
Lesotho and South Africa had their own implementation
structures consisting of a strategic Project Coordination
Committee and a Project Coordination Unit that in practice
4 The last reason has earned them the name ‘Peace Parks’.
5 See Peace Parks Foundation http://www.peaceparks.org/
Content_1060000000_Maps.htm (accessed October 22, 2010).
6 These are national parks, nature reserves, commercial farms,
subsistence farming, grazing land, range management areas and
settlements.
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did most of the work. The two Project Coordination
Committees together formed the Bilateral Steering Com-
mittee, which was the highest decision-making body in the
project and consisted of staff members of relevant govern-
ment organisations and parastatal stakeholders.
Our research on the MDTP was carried out from 2003 to
2008 (second author) and January–April 2007 (first author).
Whereas the second author focused on the overall MDTP
intervention in both countries using multi-level analysis and
participatory observation, interview and documentary metho-
dologies, the first author concentrated on the interaction on the
local level in and around the north-eastern part of Lesotho
combining participatory observation with interviews. The
remainder of this and the next section focuses especially on
this border area of the Botha-Bothe district. The South African
border area will be addressed from the perspective of the
impact transnational relations and dynamics have on the people
in the north-east of Lesotho.
Comparable to other TFCAs, the MDTP aims to
conserve the biological and cultural diversity of the region
and to further economic development of the local popula-
tion through ecotourism. These objectives are legitimised
by a discourse postulating the necessity of urgent action to
save biodiversity.7 The roles and functions of ‘the local’
within this discourse are highly ambiguous. On the one
hand, ‘the local’ is constituted as an intruder in nature
whose interests conflict with those of a conserved environ-
ment—in fact portrayed as unsustainably exploiting bio-
logical resources and vandalising cultural resources.8 On
the other hand, ‘the local’ is depicted as the ultimate
‘manager’ of the natural resources; the ‘natural caretaker’
of the biological diversity for the benefit of all (MDTP
2006, see also Büscher 2009). Yet, despite this ‘innate’
capability, the MDTP feels the need to introduce behavioural
training, informational public gatherings and ecotourism
initiatives to motivate people to collaborate towards the
conservation goal. This paradoxical construction of ‘the local’
as either in harmony with nature or environmentally destruc-
tive is a topic often addressed in the literature (e.g., Holt 2005).
Since both perspectives are based on the arbitrary presuppo-
sition that ‘locals’ indeed solely depend on local livelihood
strategies (Hughes 2005), they continue to plague conserva-
tion and development interventions.
Turning from discourse to practice, yet another picture of
‘the local’ within the MDTP emerges. An examination of the
MDTP’s organisational structure reveals that much of the
actual implementation of the project is carried out on an extra-
local (national, international) level, prioritising planning,
research and consultancies over on-the-ground ‘dirty-boots’
work (Büscher 2009). In Lesotho, the MDTP on the local
level was mostly engaged in capacity building projects,
‘sensitisation’ exercises and pilot tourism initiatives. Initial
local reactions towards the MDTP focusing on possible
economic and commercial possibilities were positive
(Büscher 2010a). Yet, overall, it seemed that little to none
of the intended effects of the intervention materialized for
most villagers. Interviews in the village of Nyakoaneng,9
part of an MDTP pilot project area, for example, revealed
that not even half of the interviewees knew the MDTP and
its work in 2007. Those who did know about the MDTP
were part of an MDTP institution, a participant in an MDTP-
initiated training, a member of a local institution, or a relative
of someone in one of those groups. A small group of
interviewees had heard about the MDTP once in a public
gathering but nothing more after that. A picture of ‘the local’
emerges as individuals interested in the economic possibil-
ities of the intervention but little preoccupied with its
objectives. Yet, this is not to say that the intervention had
no effects at all on the local level.10 For these to become
more readily apparent, however, they had to be triggered by
specific dynamics, for instance, the probability of conflict.
Conflict and Community Around the North-Eastern
Lesotho Border
The lives and identities of the Basotho living in north-
eastern Lesotho have for long been shaped by and have
shaped transnational processes. The MDTP, in this respect,
is only a very recent and minor element. In the 1830s,
during the time of the Difaqane—the ‘times of trouble’—
many African peoples were displaced by Zulu aggression
and expansion, as well as by the ‘Great Trek,’ the
northwards March of the Boers11 to escape British rule.
The Basotho, under Chief Moshoeshoe, were forced to
retreat to the mountains and eventually to accept a
settlement whereby they lost most of their fertile land to
the Boers (Thompson 2006). As a result, people of Sotho
origin live on both sides of the South Africa-Lesotho border
and still dispute its legitimacy. They refer to the lost land, a
large part of the South African Free State, as ‘Conquered
Territory’ (Coplan 2001). By challenging the legitimacy of
the border they are able to voice their very local economic
hardships, which are exacerbated by the loss of the land.
Interestingly, the MDTP, as a ‘transfrontier’ project, has
renewed the attention to the border issue, and even further
reinforced its contingent historical nature. In fact, as we
shall see, the transnationalising dynamics unleashed by the
7 See www.maloti.org (accessed March 3, 2010).
8 See www.maloti.org (accessed March 3, 2010).
10 See Wittmayer (2007), for some of the (unintended) effects of the
intervention, such as the enhancement of local state presence and the
simplification of land administration.
11 ‘Boers’ are descendents of Dutch settlers in South Africa.
9 Botha-Bothe district, north-eastern Lesotho.
766 Hum Ecol (2010) 38:763–773
MDTP have both complicated transnational relations
between Basotho in South Africa and Lesotho and
strengthened them.
Economically, the livelihoods of the population in
Lesotho have always been tied to South Africa. In the late
nineteenth century, South African mines were the key
market for excess crops of successful farmers. Lesotho’s
economy, however, was drastically impacted when, among
other changes, the South African government introduced
protectionist measures.12 By the 1930s Lesotho had
developed into a “labour reserve” (Murray 1981: 1),
providing migrant labour for the mines in Gauteng and
the farms in the Free State. This process peaked in the
1970s and 1980s, when crucial livelihood support was
provided through migrant labour activities and remittances.
Subsequent falling gold prices and a restructuring within
the mining industry have led to massive retrenchments.
Tens of thousands of men returned to their fields in
Lesotho13 and tried to reintegrate with their families and
communities. In the village of Nyakoaneng, where up to 90%
of the men used to work in the mines, their return had a
massive socio-economic impact as families could no longer
rely on at least one steady income. Some of the men used their
redundancy payments to become entrepreneurs in their
villages—often unsuccessfully. More successful have been
some of the younger men for whom a career at the mines was
not as certain as it had once been for many Basotho men.
Morebane Ramanotsi with his innovative idea of setting up a
bed and breakfast is a good, although exceptional, example.
The general picture, though, is of a certain re-focussing on
more ‘traditional’ local and localised activities: farming and
cattle herding. But successful farming on Lesotho’s mountain
soils is highly contingent on external cash inputs, which had
been provided by remittances from migrant labourers, for
buying fertilizer or paying for timely ploughing (Murray
1981; Ferguson 1994; Boehm 2003a; Turner 2005b). In this
sense, these macro-economic changes have directly affected
rural life all over Lesotho. Moreover, the return of the miners
and their efforts to re-establish livelihoods in the local
context has sparked what could be called a localisation
dynamic, whereby ‘local’ is again being redefined within the
range of multiple identities of the Basotho.
Thus, livelihoods and identities in Lesotho have to be
understood in relation to their historical formation and current
embeddings as a consequence of interactions with South
Africa as well as the rest of the world. For example, there are
increasing influences on the society by Asian immigrant
entrepreneurs and Asian textile companies offering employ-
ment to young women, and of course the global aid industry,
which despite some decline in interest, is still a formidable
presence in the country (especially the capital).14 The Basotho
themselves construct their social and economic spaces
transnationally as they live, work, study, visit friends or
shop across the border—whether they live in the ‘Conquered
Territory’ or the north-eastern part of Lesotho.
The following two case studies—the disputed plans of a
new national park in Lesotho and a golf course in South
Africa, both directly on the international border—illustrate
some of the pressures of localisation and transnationalisa-
tion on the lives, livelihoods and identities of the Basotho
in north-eastern Lesotho, and the role of conflict therein.
Case 1: The Proposed Liqobong National Park
in Lesotho and Its Link with Golden Gate National
Park in South Africa
Establishing transfrontier parks within larger transfrontier
conservation areas serves to strengthen the stature of the
overall TFCA, as well as the institutional bonding between
the countries involved. It is important to note here the
difference between a transfrontier park and a transfrontier
area. Whereas the former usually focuses on one single
land-use (often strict conservation) the latter subsumes
multiple types of land-use as mentioned earlier. From this
perspective, the MDTP has been keen to establish a second
border-spanning national park connecting Golden Gate
National Park in South Africa with a counterpart in north-
eastern Lesotho.15 Yet, the planning of the creation of the
counterpart in Lesotho has already provoked local protest.
From 2006, the MDTP has been investigating the
establishment of a national park close to the border in
Lesotho, in an area known as ‘Liqobong’. According to the
MDTP Lesotho Protected Area planner,16 the national park
would protect the important ‘sponge area’ of the Caledon
River—the area that catches and concentrates the rainfall at
the river’s origin—and create a surrounding buffer area
where human movement is allowed. The further rationale for
the protected area he presented revolved around three issues
considered strategically important for Lesotho. First, it
would help the country to come closer to fulfilling its
12 Other changes were cheaper imports from overseas and within
Lesotho the introduction of the hut tax, armed conflict and the need
for weapons, livestock epidemics and a series of droughts and locust
attacks (See Murray 1981; Ferguson 1994, 2006; Boehm 2003a;
Turner 2005a).
13 According to Chris Hector, Regional Manager for Lesotho and the
Eastern Free State at the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) a
decline from up to 130,000 miners in the 1970s and 1980s to around
50,000 at present (Boehm 2003b: 4).
14 See Ferguson (1994) for an interesting but dated overview of the
presence of the aid industry in Lesotho.
15 Within the MDTP area, Sehlabathebe National Park in Lesotho has
been linked to uKhahlamba Drakensberg Park World Heritage Site in
South Africa since 2007.
16 Personal Interview, January 16, 2007, in Maseru, Lesotho.
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obligations under the Convention of Biological Diversity to
put 10% of its land aside for conservation. Second, it would
boost local economic development by creating employment
opportunities, and third, the new protected area would
enhance Lesotho’s international reputation as a tourist
destination. This top-down approach shows clearly that
CBNRM is not hegemonic in practice but also that
considerations about communities were secondary. The maps
used by the MDTP reflected neither local land uses nor the
fact that the area is historically regarded as sacred—people
use it for prayer and to make sacrifices for rain.17
Consequently, parts of the population in the area were not
convinced by the MDTP arguments and intensely resisted
the plans. In October 2006, a group of around 30 local cattle
herders articulated their disapproval in a letter to the
Ombudsman of the Lesotho government, stating that on the
land in question, they were grazing cattle, farming and
visiting graves of their ancestors. They even expressed their
fears that the whole plan was a scam to sell the land to South
Africa.
The consultation process resulted in a meeting in
February 2007 of the project advocates (local MDTP staff
and state representatives), the protesters and the local
population to discuss the objections against the park.18
During this meeting the project advocates argued that the
‘whole community’ had been involved in participation
processes from the start, including activities such as public
gatherings, an area tour, the establishment of a Community
Conservation Forum and a tour to visit communities living
next to two already existing national parks. The protesters,
however, had not used those participatory or other common
traditional mediation methods (e.g., the chiefly structure) to
voice their concerns. During the meeting some were even
denying that these activities had taken place at all. Instead,
for voicing their concerns, they relied on a modern
democratic instrument, namely the institution of the
Ombudsman, although during the meeting it became clear
that the protesters had no knowledge about the working of
the modern democratic processes they had appealed to. As
stated by one of the protestors: “We were expecting the
Ombudsman and want to talk to him, not to these
institutions. We do not want development and prefer it the
way it is. We’d rather stay hungry. Poverty is better than
development.” Another said: “I am 70 years and I am
wasting my time because the Ombudsman is not here.” It
was clear that the MDTP, departing from a certain
assumption of the ‘local’, inherent in the CBNRM
discourse had chosen for ways of consultation that were
not able to address the concerns about land access and use
nor the historically constituted fear of the local population
about ‘losing’ their land to South Africa.
Instead, MDTP staff explained the protests as well as the
appeal to the Ombudsman as the result of external—
national and transnational—influences that were inciting
and taking advantage of local fears for political gain,
holding out the possibility of local support for the protected
area. This convenient explanation was first presented at an
earlier MDTP meeting in January 2007 at the Lesotho
Northern Parks headquarters in Botha Bothe, when the
MDTP Botha Bothe Regional Officer, outlining the state of
plans for the proposed park, stated that when they started
discussing the idea with the local communities it “went
wrong”: the issue became politicised and the communities
even thought that their (Lesotho) land was going to be sold
to South Africa. Besides that, there was resistance from
cattle owners, who according to the MDTP Regional
Officer also “think we are going to take their land.”
Another MDTP Officer added that with land issues, many
people automatically think of the “the lost land in the Free
State,” as he referred to the Conquered Territory. He stated
that political parties, in the heated national election
campaign of 2007, were accusing each other of wanting
to sell land to South Africa. He added that “the interests in
the area are bigger than the area can accommodate.” As the
number of people using the Liqobong area is bigger than
the number of people living there it is hard to address all
their interests. In short, the MDTP firstly argued that local
interests and fears were being manipulated during the then
ongoing national election campaigns by politicians of the
opposition party, and secondly, that local cattle herders
were being mobilized to oppose the park by a rich cattle
owner from South Africa cooperating with them in the
border region where the national park was to be created.
The struggle about access to and use of a certain area of
land which protesters voiced was neither taken at face value
nor seriously addressed by the MDTP.
During the meeting, the project advocates attempted to
convince the cattle herders to change their stance through what
they considered rational reasoning. The lawyer of the
Community Council for example, referring to the Land Act
1979, said: “There will not be an enforcement of the park onto
you, but negotiations. There will be compensations should you
be adversely affected by the creation of a park.” Their
reasoning was influenced by an evolutionary model of
development thinking whereby the ‘developed’ project advo-
cates help the ‘naïve’ locals to see the (economic, social, etc.)
opportunities that would arise from a protected area—and they
were partially successful. One said for example: “You only
17 As outlined by the Area Chief: “The wetland of Liqobong is
important for us, because people pray there for rain. After 1962 [the
year his Christian mother as wife of the Principal Chief banned it], this
has become less, but still I know of people taking a sheep there,
slaughter it and pray for rain.” Personal Interview, March 15, 2007, in
Makhunoane, Lesotho.
18 The meeting was held on February 1st, 2007 just outside the village
of Mafikalisiu and was attended by both authors.
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reject the park because you do not know how beneficial it is. In
this you think like children.”Advocates employed rationalistic
development discourse and the prospect of a possible
economic advantage to legitimise the intervention and to mask
the underlying struggles over access to and control over natural
resources that are at times exacerbated by returning miners
trying to find their local bearings again.
Despite the rather hostile atmosphere during the meeting—
evidenced by threats and physically separated groups—it also
became clear that the conflict was not limited to the MDTP
and the local community but was taking place within the
“local community” as well. On the one hand, spurred on by
cross-boundary cattle networks, there were protestors in the
local community that opposed the park vigorously, stating not
only that poverty is better than development but also that if the
park materializes they “will fight.” On the other hand, it
appeared that a great majority of ‘the community’ with
interests in Liqobong—which seemed to include even villages
30 km from the actual proposed site, including Nyakoaneng
where we did the bulk of our research—had in fact never
heard of the plans for a protected area in Liqobong. Asked for
their opinion, the villagers were near unanimous in their
approval of a protected area, including Morebane Ramonotsi.
The Chief of Nyakoaneng, for example, said that she likes it,
“because people can then see what good grazing land looks
like.”19 She even supported access restrictions, trusting that
people will still get some advantages out of the park.
Another villager,20 who is also a member of the MDTP
District Steering Committee, mentioned he “would like
Liqobong to go on because it again will bring more tourists.”
In particular, he stated that it will then be a network of
protected areas, from Golden Gate to Liqobong to Liphofung
to Tseshlanyane, and further. According to him: “The
majority of the people are in favour, so it will not be a big
deal.” Lastly, one of the local councillors stated that she likes
the idea of the park; the area is beautiful, so “it can attract
tourists.” For her the establishment of the park is worth
having restrictions on access and use of the area “because of
tourists” and “so that people can sell handicrafts to them.”
She continued that: “even though it is restricted, people can
still use the place and when the grass is good again, it can be
cut and given to the animals. In the beginning, however, one
has to be strict, otherwise people don’t listen. In developing
things, people have to see that it works, then they will
understand and appreciate it.”21
It became apparent that where some members of the
‘community’ believe their livelihood options will be
curtailed by the park, others clearly think and hope, in line
with the TFCA reasoning, that there is enough other land
on which cattle can be grazed and that a national park can
attract tourists and create new livelihood opportunities.
This conflict within the wider ‘community’ undermines
again the still popular development ideas about ‘community
homogeneity.’ On this issue, local people were not only
split between those that were informed and those that were
not, but also between those believing in ‘development’
through the park, and those potentially threatened in their
lives and livelihoods by the park. All sides were affected
simultaneously by transnationalising and ‘localising’ dynam-
ics, making the conflict even harder to analyze. Conflicting
positions also occur within a smaller group supposedly
sharing ‘one’ prime identity, i.e., the cattle herders. Cattle
herding had always been important in Lesotho, but gained
renewed significance with the return of retrenched miners,22
who now primarily have become cattle herders and need to
build new livelihood strategies and identities. Yet, while for
one group of herders the proposed protected area threatened
their lucrative transnational cattle schemes, another group of
herders in Nyakoaneng regarded the new transnational
possibilities brought by the park as an opportunity. Thus, a
complicated picture emerges in which local people in north-
eastern Lesotho seem to face many choices in terms of
livelihood creation and identity building. Although these
choices have of course always existed (Sen 2006), we argue
that simultaneous transnationalising and localising dynamics
further increased the complexity of livelihoods and ‘forced’
the villagers to increase their flexibility as, for example, in
assuming the identity of ‘protester’ or ‘pro-park’ or choosing
between traditional and democratic methods for mediation.
Case 2: Proposed Golf Terrain in South Africa
Another example of how conflict—or rather potential
conflict—and transnationalism can go hand in hand and
affect local life in north-eastern Lesotho is the Royal Maluti
golf estate in the Free State, South Africa. Situated on a
1,472 ha site, midway between Clarens and Fouriesburg on
the Caledon River, it will have two 18-hole courses and
approximately 1,000 residential sites including a hospital
and shopping area as well as associated infrastructure.23
Already in 2006, the local press expected the golf estate to
bring a new stimulus to the stagnating Free State economy
by attracting foreign tourists.24
In order to be approved by local and provincial
government bodies, an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) was required.
19 Personal Interview January 22, 2007 in Nyakonaeng, Lesotho.
20 Idem.
21 Personal Interview January 23, 2007, in Nyakonaeng, Lesotho.
22 See also Boehm (2003a).
23 See www.royalmaluti.com for more information.
24 See http://www.bulletinonline.co.za/archives/specfeat/16july2006.
php (accessed March 3, 2010).
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The results of the assessment were presented at a public
meeting on January 19, 2007, in the municipality of Clarens
as part of the public participation process. The main
audience were local South African Basotho, with the two
authors also attending. Clearly the most important part of
the presentation, judging by the commotion in the room,
was the discussion of the socioeconomic consequences of
the development of the golf estate. The EIA concludes that
the golf estate will bring employment to the residents of the
nearby Kgubetswana (Clarens) and Mahaneeg (Fouriesburg)
townships, which currently experience up to 89%
unemployment (Strategic Environment Focus 2006a:
35). Plans were to establish a community trust worth
Rand 35 million, run by a Community Liaison Forum for
the direct benefit of the local population (e.g., offering
training). What was referred to by ‘local population’ did
not include Basotho living across the border in Lesotho.
This was made clear by the presenter, who said in a raised
voice, “no Lesotho residents will be employed at the expense
of local residents,” which earned her big applause. During the
discussion that followed the presentation, it was only the
South African MDTP project planner who brought up the
interests of the Basotho communities living right across the
international boundary, geographically much closer to the site
than the two towns participating in the ‘socio-environmental
impact assessment’ process.25 After stating that the MDTP
pursued positive transnational dynamics, he suggested an
agreement that would secure 5%–10% of the jobs for people
from Lesotho. Not only do they live closest to the golf estate,
he argued, but this would also honor regional cooperation
plans (such as the Southern African Development Community
protocol, the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development,’
and others). This comment was received with indignation by
the South African audience. The Royal Maluti planners,
playing to the audience’s sentiment, immediately promised
that only South African citizens would be taken into account
in the development plans—as per the legal requirement. The
Royal Maluti planner stated: “Every single job will be for
South African people because my responsibilities are with my
shareholders and with the South African nation.” Because the
border is of course the legal, national boundary, the
development and the public participation processes are
formally restricted to South Africa.
Later research revealed that most Basotho in north-eastern
Lesotho were unaware of the development of a golf course.
Neither the Area Chief nor the Principal Chief of the area
adjacent to the border had heard about its possible establish-
ment. Still they were confident that the District Authorities of
Clarens, with whom they convene regularly to discuss cross-
border matters, will bring up the issue in one of their meetings.
Interestingly, the constraints placed by the legal boundary did
not seem to be very problematic to them. The Lesotho Chief
of the bordering area reasoned that it was clear that his people
would have the jobs in the end, because “the people from
Clarens and Fouriesburg are not prepared to travel to this
remote place.”26 Whether this is wishful thinking or not is
still to be seen, and in any event is not the main issue, which
is that other (transnational) issues than excluding Lesotho
inhabitants from official processes in South Africa seem to
pose bigger problems.
Three major transnational issues are especially important
and very likely to fuel the looming local conflict over the
golf estate.
The first centres on the use of Lesotho’s most valuable
resource—water—by the golf estate. It was during the EIA
when one of the presenters intentionally or not referred to
the importance of water while trying to convince the
audience of his sincerity: “If we do not perform, cut off
our water.” According to the planners, the golf course will
be supplied with water directly from the Lesotho Highland
Water Project (LHWP) scheme by accessing the under-
ground tunnel that transports the water from the high
altitude water reservoirs in Lesotho to the Ash River in
South Africa. Neither the population of Lesotho nor the
communities in the Free State have access to this water, as
it is diverted directly to the Gauteng region of South Africa.
And people are aware of this. The Muela Dam, which is a
part of the infrastructure of the LHWP, is situated next to
the village of Nyakoaneng. One of the villagers said that
“the Highlands Water Project has helped only the people in
South Africa and not the communities here. Our commu-
nity does not have running water or electricity although the
Muela Dam is right round the corner.”27 A shared dream of
many of the villagers, expressed during interviews, was for
“running water.” In a water-poor region like Southern
Africa, it is exactly these types of situations that according
to Solomon and Turton (2000) are likely to create social
unrest and conflict.
The second issue is the changing nature of the border and
especially its further solidification where it used to be flexible.
While in international and national law it is portrayed as a
strict dividing line, the north-eastern Lesotho—South Africa
Free State border is geographically only a small river. Apart
from the border-crossings, the few parts that are fenced are
done so poorly and do not obstruct free movement. Herders
from Lesotho with their cattle can frequently be spotted on the
South African side of the Caledon River and South African
farmers employ day labourers from Lesotho in their fields.28
25 In fact, a Lesotho village lies on a hill-side overlooking the valley
where the golf estate is being built (see also Fig. 2).
26 Personal Interview, March 15, 2007 in Mokhunoane, Lesotho.
27 Personal Interview, January 21, 2007 in Nyakoaneng, Lesotho.
28 Observation and interview data. See also Coplan (2001, 2006) and
Steinberg (2005).
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The building of the golf estate, however, would lead to the
establishment of a gated community along the border with a
stringent security strategy including an electric fence system
and regular patrols in place (Strategic Environment Focus
2006b). This complicates transnational relations on the local
level in the same area where the MDTP aims to correct the
arbitrariness with which African borders have been drawn
historically and to reconcile communities that are divided by
this border (Derwent et al. 2003). It could as well be seen as
obstructing efforts by the District Authorities of Clarens to
establish cordial cross-border relations with Lesotho Chiefs
through regular meetings and exchange of experiences.
An added complication to the solidification of the border is
that inequality will be solidified too. Royal Maluti boasts on its
website that “an incomparable setting, untouched beauty as far
as the eye can see and world-class facilities set Royal Maluti
apart”.29 Indeed, the “incomparable” and “unmatched”
facilities include—besides the two golf courses—a “village
square with exclusive retail and restaurant facilities,” a
gymnasium, tennis courts, squash courts, indoor pool
facilities, a wellness centre, an equestrian centre, and “child-
ren’s entertainment facilities.” The houses built will be
“distinctive and timeless” and will “reflect international
luxury in union with nature and the location” (see Fig. 1).
All this stands in stark contrast to the services, houses and
living conditions of the local people, both those across the
border in Lesotho (see Fig. 2) and the township dwellers of
Clarens and Fouriesburg. But the problem is not just of
“unrivalled luxury” and unrivalled poverty side-by-side. The
securitization of the land also means fewer possibilities for
land-based livelihoods for local Basotho people.
The third major issue centres on historical demographic
patterns. The overwhelming majority of the African commu-
nities of Kgubetswana and Mahaneeg are in fact Basotho
people who had moved to the Free State or were born in the
‘Conquered Territory.’ Their identification with the South
African state and condemnation of the MDTP’s suggestion to
share benefits of the golf estate across the border (and thus
their support of the white golf estate planners), explicitly
meant the exclusion of their ‘brothers and sisters’ across the
border. Their approval of the EIA report in order to keep the
opportunities for jobs also meant the silent sanctioning of the
above-mentioned security measures. Consequently, the Baso-
tho of Lesotho will in the near future be regarded as
“trespassers” (Strategic Environment Focus 2006a: 44) into
what was once their ancestral territory whose status they still
dispute and into which they extend their social spaces and
livelihoods.30 While Morebane’s grandmother, like many
others, was working as a day labourer on the white farms
just across the Caledon River, he himself will be denied this
opportunity with regard to the work on the golf estate. He
also has family in the Free State and regularly goes shopping
in Clarens for, e.g., seeds and—more recently—for his
wedding rings.
It is interesting here that with new (transnational)
influences, new alliances are forged. The Basotho do not
cling to historically relevant group boundaries or identities
(black vs. white, Basotho united) but forge flexible alliances
built on the basis of local interest and the need to diversify
livelihood strategies according to new opportunities.
Conclusion: Conserving Conflict?
The dynamics of transnationalisation and localisation as
they are occurring in north-eastern Lesotho harbour a
29 All quotes from www.royalmaluti.com.
Fig. 1 ‘A typical house’ on Royal Maluti golf estate (www.
royalmaluti.com)
Fig. 2 The view from the future golf terrain, across the border (the
river bed of the Caledon River in foreground of picture), onto a village
in Lesotho (Picture taken by first author)
30 See Coplan (2001, 2006), Steinberg (2005) and own interview data
and observation.
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diversity of elements. The examination of two local
conflicts sharply brought to the fore that in interaction with
these dynamics ‘the locals’ are forced to continuously
enhance their flexibility in face of an ever-increasingly
complex configuration of livelihood, identity and alliances.
We have described the historical constitution of ‘the
Basotho’ to show that the transnational context of their life
worlds is not new. However, it is through their interaction with
the concrete presence of two generally ‘abstract’ contemporary
dynamics, transnationalisation by the MDTP and increased
localisation through retrenchments, that consequences for
livelihoods and identity seem to be sharply highlighted. It is
especially within the framework of conflicts (potential
conflicts) that the meaning of ‘local’ stretches, is redefined
and reworked. ‘The local’ him- or herself makes new choices
concerning livelihood options (e.g., ecotourism initiatives or
cattle herding), identity (protester or pro-park) and alliances
(South African or Basotho).
Transnational conservation and development discourses,
such as within theMDTP, target and would like to engage with
the political level of everyday life decisions. Yet, this is also the
level at which interventions such as those of the MDTP find
hardest to engage with effectively (Ferguson 1994), which in
fact often leads them to stay focused on discourse rather than
practice (Büscher and Dressler 2007; Büscher 2009, 2010a).
This very tendency further reduces the chances for inter-
ventions to reach their ‘win-win’ objectives and in fact, might
even have the opposite effect of ‘conserving conflict.’ After
all, when interventions focus on their political positioning,
they lose sight of the fact that in the end it is (still) the land
that is the “key element of localisation” (Staring et al. 1997:
19) and is exactly what is important in the context of multiple
localities. In Liqobong, it is the land used by cattle herders;
between Clarens and Fouriesburg, it is the land known as
‘Conquered Territory.’ Viewed from an historical perspective,
the transnational context in which locality is constructed in
north-eastern Lesotho becomes evident.
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